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We investigate the security bounds of quantum cryptographic protocols using d-level systems. In
particular, we focus on schemes that use two mutually unbiased bases, thus extending the BB84
quantum key distribution scheme to higher dimensions. Under the assumption of general coherent
attacks, we derive an analytic expression for the ultimate upper security bound of such quantum
cryptography schemes. This bound is well below the predictions of optimal cloning machines. The
possibility of extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement distillation is discussed. In the case
of qutrits we argue that any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one. For higher
dimensions such an equivalence is generally no longer valid.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, several quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocols have been proposed, which
use two-level quantum systems (qubits) as information
carriers [1, 2, 3]. The security of these protocols against
all kinds of attacks has been analyzed extensively and
various unconditional security proofs have been presented
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. From the experimental point of view,
a number of prototypes based on qubits have been devel-
oped [11], while QKD has been successfully performed
outside the laboratory at distances up to about 67km us-
ing telecom fibers [12, 13], and up to 23.4km [14] through
open air.
In contrast to qubits, the use of high-dimensional
quantum systems in quantum cryptography has at-
tracted considerable attention only recently. Currently,
qudits (d-dimensional quantum systems) can be real-
ized experimentally in several ways (including multi-
port beam splitters, bi-photons, higher-order paramet-
ric down-conversion and energy-time entanglement) [15,
16, 17]. As far as QKD protocols are concerned, qudits
can carry more information than qubits increasing thus
the flux of information between the two legitimate users
(Alice and Bob). For a prime power d it has been demon-
strated that there exist (d+1) mutually unbiased bases.
Hence, the natural extensions of the standard BB84 and
six-state qubit-based QKD protocols to higher dimen-
sions involve 2d and d(d+1) states, respectively [18, 19].
These latter qudit-based QKD schemes are able to toler-
ate higher error rates than their qubit-based counterparts
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
The maximal error rate that can be tolerated by a par-
ticular QKD protocol (also referred to as threshold distur-
bance) quantifies the robustness of the protocol against
a specific eavesdropping strategy, and depends on the al-
gorithm that Alice and Bob are using for post-processing
their raw key. In practice, nowadays secret keys can be
distilled efficiently by means of one- or even two-way clas-
sical post-processing [26, 27], while advantage distillation
protocols using two-way classical communication seem to
be still rather inefficient [28]. In principle, however, quan-
tum distillation protocols involving two-way communica-
tion between Alice and Bob [also referred to as two-way
entanglement purification protocols (EPPs)] can tolerate
substantially higher error rates than their classical coun-
terparts and can be applied whenever the quantum state
shared between the two honest parties is freely entangled,
i.e. distillable [29, 30, 31, 32].
For 2⊗2 quantum systems, non-distillability is equiva-
lent to separability [33, 34] and thus there seems to exist
a complete equivalence between entanglement distillation
and secrecy. In particular, for qubit-based QKD proto-
cols and under the assumption of individual attacks, it
was proven recently that the extraction of a secret key
from a quantum state is possible if and only if entan-
glement distillation is possible [35]. For higher dimen-
sions, however, the complete equivalence between entan-
glement distillation and secrecy, has been put into ques-
tion by Horodecki et al. [36], who showed that a secret
key can, in principle, be extracted even from bound en-
tangled states [37]. Nevertheless, for arbitrary dimen-
sions, provable quantum entanglement is always a nec-
essary precondition for secure QKD [38]. Therefore, the
natural question arises whether qudit-based QKD proto-
cols can indeed go beyond entanglement distillation. In
other words, what is the maximal error rate that can, in
principle, be tolerated by a qudit-based QKD under the
assumption of general coherent attacks ?
In this paper, we address this question by focus-
ing on qudit-based QKD protocols that use two mutu-
ally unbiased bases. Up to date, all investigations re-
lated to the security of such protocols have concentrated
mainly on individual attacks (e.g. quantum cloning ma-
chines) and/or one-way post-processing of the raw key
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Here, under the assumption of gen-
eral coherent (joint) attacks, we show that for estimated
disturbances below (d− 1)/2d Alice and Bob can be con-
fident that they share distillable entanglement with high
probability. On the other hand, an estimated disturbance
above (d − 1)/2d does not enable Alice and Bob to in-
fer that their quantum state is entangled (no provable
quantum entanglement). Hence, in view of the necessary
precondition for secure key distribution [38], our result
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old disturbance for the prepare-and-measure schemes of
the protocols. Furthermore, our result implies that, for
the post-processing we consider throughout this work,
the extraction of a secret key beyond entanglement dis-
tillation is impossible in the framework of qudit-based
QKD protocols using two bases.
This paper is organized as follows : For the sake of
completeness, in Sec. II we summarize basic facts which
are necessary for the subsequent discussion. In Sec.
III we briefly describe the prepare-and-measure and the
entanglement-based versions of the 2-bases QKD proto-
cols using qudits. Subsequently, Sec. IV focuses on the
key quantity of this work namely, the estimated error rate
(disturbance) and its symmetries. Finally, the threshold
disturbance for 2-bases qudit-based QKD protocols, is
derived in Sec. V and various examples are presented.
II. QUDITS AND THE GENERALIZED PAULI
GROUP
Throughout this work we consider QKD protocols with
qudit systems as information carriers. Each qudit cor-
responds to a d−dimensional Hilbert space Cd where
d = pr is a prime power, i.e. p is a prime and r is an inte-
ger [39]. From now on all the arithmetics are performed
in the finite (Galois) field Fd [40].
Theoretical investigations of d-level quantum systems
are performed conveniently with the help of the gener-
alized Pauli group. For this purpose let us define the
unitary operators
X =
∑
α∈Fd
|α+ 1〉〈α| , (1)
Z =
∑
α∈Fd
ωtr(α) |α〉〈α| , (2)
where ω = exp(i2pi/p) is a primitive p-th root of unity
and
tr(α) =
r−1∑
j=0
αp
j
(3)
is the absolute trace of α ∈ Fd. The states { |α〉;α ∈ Fd}
constitute an orthonormal computational basis on the
Hilbert space of a qudit Cd. The unitary operators X
and Z generate the generalized Pauli group with unitary
elements
Emn = {XmZn : m,n ∈ Fd}. (4)
These d2 unitary operators form an error group on Cd
[41], and are the generalizations of the Pauli operators
for qubits. In fact the indices m and n refer to shift
and phase errors in the computational basis, respectively.
Thus the generalized Pauli operators can be represented
in the form
Emn =
∑
k∈Fd
ωtr(k·n) |k +m〉〈k| , (5)
with
ZnXm = ωtr(m·n)XmZn. (6)
Consider now a bipartite system of two qudits A and
B. It is not hard to show that the operators XA ⊗ X ∗B
and ZA⊗Z∗B constitute a complete set of commuting op-
erators in the Hilbert space of two distinguishable qudits
CdA⊗CdB, while their simultaneous eigenstates are the d2
maximally entangled states
|Ψmn〉 = 1√
d
∑
k∈Fd
1A |kA〉 ⊗ Emn;B |kB〉, (7)
with m,n ∈ Fd. These states are the generalization of
the Bell states to higher dimensions and they form an or-
thonormal basis in CdA⊗CdB. The singlet state |Ψ00〉 is of
particular interest because it remains invariant under any
unitary transformation of the form UA⊗U∗B. In fact |Ψ00〉
is one of the key elements of the entanglement-based ver-
sion of the qudit cryptographic protocols described in the
following section.
III. TWO-BASES QKD PROTOCOLS
A. Mutually unbiased bases
Of central importance in the context of QKD is the no-
tion of mutually unbiased (maximally conjugated) bases.
It has been demonstrated that for a prime power d, there
exist d + 1 such bases, i.e. the eigenbases of the opera-
tors Z, X ,XZ, XZ2, . . . ,XZd−1 [18, 19]. In a qudit-
based 2-bases QKD protocol (to be referred to hereafter
as 2d-state protocol), Alice and Bob use for their pur-
poses only two mutually unbiased bases B1 and B2 with
d basis-states each. Following [24, 25], from now on the
eigenbasis { |k〉 : k ∈ Fd} of the operator Z is chosen as
the standard (computational) basis B1, while the second
basis B2 ≡ { |l¯〉 : l ∈ Fd} is chosen as the Fourier-dual of
the computational basis, i.e. |l¯〉 ≡∑kHlk |k〉, with
H = 1√
d
∑
i,j∈Fd
ωtr(i·j) |i〉〈j| (8)
denoting the discrete Fourier transformation. One can
verify easily that H is symmetric and thus unitary, i.e.
H† = H−1 = H∗. This property will be used exten-
sively in the following sections. Besides, errors in the two
maximally conjugated bases are related via the discrete
Fourier transform, i.e.
H†EmnH = ω−tr(m·n)E∗nm. (9)
In other words, shift errors in the computational basis be-
come phase errors in the complementary basis and vice-
versa.
3B. Prepare-and-measure QKD scheme
In a typical 2d-state prepare-and-measure scheme Al-
ice sends to Bob a sequence of qudits each of which is
randomly prepared in one of the 2d non-orthogonal basis-
states { |k〉} or { |l¯〉}. Bob measures each received parti-
cle randomly in B1 or B2. After the distribution stage,
Alice and Bob agree on a random permutation of their
data and publicly discuss the bases chosen, discarding all
the dits where they have selected different bases (sifting
procedure). Subsequently, they randomly select a suf-
ficient number of dits [42] from the remaining random
sifted key and determine their error probability. If, as
a result of a noisy quantum channel or of an eavesdrop-
per, the estimated disturbance is too high the protocol
is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob perform error cor-
rection and privacy amplification with one- or two-way
classical communication, in order to obtain a smaller
number of secret and perfectly correlated random dits
[10, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
C. Entanglement-based QKD scheme
From the point of view of an arbitrarily powerful eaves-
dropper the above prepare-and-measure scheme is equiv-
alent to an entanglement-based QKD protocol [20, 25,
43]. In this latter form of the protocol Alice prepares
each of 2N entangled-qudit pairs in the maximally en-
tangled state
|Ψ00〉 = 1√
d
∑
k∈Fd
|kA〉 ⊗ |kB〉, (10)
where the subscripts A,B refer to Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. Alice uses for her purposes the set of bases
{B1,B2} whereas Bob uses the set {B1,B∗2}, where B∗2 ≡
{H∗ |k〉 : k ∈ Fd} [20, 25].
More precisely, Alice keeps half of each pair and sub-
mits the other half to Bob after having applied a random
unitary transformation chosen from the set {1 ,H}. As
soon as Bob acknowledges the reception of all the par-
ticles, Alice reveals the sequence of operations she per-
formed on the transmitted qudits and Bob undoes all
of them, i.e. he applies 1 or H−1 on each qudit sepa-
rately. Thus, at this point, in an ideal system Alice and
Bob would share 2N qudit-pairs in the state |Ψ00〉⊗2N .
However, in real systems, due to noise and/or eavesdrop-
ping all the 2N entangled-qudit pairs will be corrupted.
In order to ensure secret key distribution Alice and Bob
permute randomly all the pairs before doing any other
operations [10]. In this way, any influence of the eaves-
dropper (from now on we assume that all the noise in the
channel is due to eavesdropping) is equally distributed
among all the pairs.
The next step of the protocol now involves a verifi-
cation test which will determine whether the protocol
should be aborted or not. More precisely, Alice and Bob
randomly select a number of pairs (say Nc) [42] as check
pairs and measure each one of them separately along the
standard (computational) basis. They compare their re-
sults publicly thus estimating the average error rate dur-
ing the transmission. After the verification test all the
check pairs are dismissed and, if the estimated error rate
is too high the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and
Bob apply an appropriate EPP with classical one- or two-
way communication [20, 29, 30, 31, 32] on the remaining
2N − Nc pairs, in order to distill a smaller number of
almost pure entangled-qudit pairs. Finally, measuring
these almost perfectly entangled qudit pairs in a com-
mon basis, Alice and Bob obtain a secret random key,
about which an adversary has negligible information. In
our subsequent treatment we focus on the entanglement-
based version of the 2d-state QKD protocol.
IV. ESTIMATED DISTURBANCE AND
SYMMETRIES
The verification test performed by Alice and Bob im-
mediately after the transmission stage is perhaps the
most crucial stage of the 2-bases QKD protocol and its
success relies on the “commuting-observables” idea [4].
More precisely, the fact that all the operations performed
in a typical EPP commute with a Bell measurement al-
lows one to reduce any quantum eavesdropping attack to
a classical probabilistic cheating strategy [4, 7, 10, 20].
During the verification test Alice and Bob focus on
the parity of their outcomes. Moreover, note that for
the check pairs where Alice and Bob have performed H
and H−1 respectively, the measurements are effectively
performed in the complementary B2 basis rather than the
standard basis B1 [6]. Thus, given the unitarity of H and
the invariance of |Ψ00〉 under any unitary transformation
of the form UA ⊗ U∗B, the average estimated disturbance
(error rate) is given by
D =
1
2Nc
∑
b=0,1
Nc∑
ji=1
TrA,B
{[(
Hb†A ⊗HbB
)
P
(
HbA ⊗Hb†B
)]
ji
ρAB
}
, (11)
where ρAB denotes the reduced density operator of Alice and Bob for all 2N pairs. The index ji indicates that the
4corresponding physical observable refers to the ji-th ran-
domly selected qudit-pair. In particular, the projection
operator entering Eq. (11) is given by
Pji ≡
∑
l∈Fd
∑
k∈F∗
d
|lA, (l + k)B〉〈lA, (l + k)B| , (12)
where F∗d denotes the set of all nonzero elements in the
field Fd [44]. In other words, the inner summation in (12)
is performed over all the nonzero elements of the finite
field Fd, such that (l+k)B 6= lA. Moreover, the powers of
the discrete Fourier transformation Hb, with b ∈ {0, 1},
in Eq. (11) reflect the fact that the errors in the sifted
key originate from measurements in both complementary
bases which have been selected randomly by Alice and
Bob with equal probabilities. One can easily verify that
all the measurements performed during the verification
test are equivalent to Bell measurements. Indeed, using
the definition of the Bell states (7) the projector Pji can
be written in the form
Pji =
∑
m,n∈Fd
(1 − δm,0) |Ψmn〉〈Ψmn| , (13)
where δm,0 is the Kronecker delta [44]. This last relation
indicates that the verification test performed by Alice
and Bob is nothing else than a quality-check test of the
fidelity of the 2N pairs with respect to the ideal state
|Ψ00〉⊗2N . Hence, classical sampling theory can be ap-
plied for the estimation of the average error rate and the
establishment of confidence levels [4, 7, 10, 20].
We can simplify further our discussion by taking into
account the symmetry of the QKD protocol under any
permutation of the pairs. As we discussed earlier, a
random permutation of all the pairs at the beginning
of the entanglement-based protocols ensures a homoge-
neous distribution of the errors introduced by a poten-
tial eavesdropper (Eve) over all the qudit pairs [10]. This
is equivalent to saying that the eavesdropping attack is
symmetric on all the pairs, and such a symmetrization
argument is one of the key elements of various uncondi-
tional security proofs [6, 7, 10, 20]. Indeed, Eve does not
know in advance which of the qudit-pairs will be used for
quality checks and which qudit-pairs will contribute to
the final key. Hence, she is not able to treat them differ-
ently and the check pairs constitute a classical random
sample of all the pairs.
Invariance of the eavesdropping attack under any per-
mutation of the pairs implies that all the reduced density
operators describing the state of each pair shared between
Alice and Bob are equal, i.e.
ρ
(1)
AB = ρ
(2)
AB = · · · = ρ(2N)AB , (14)
where the reduced density operator of Alice’s and Bob’
s k-th pair is denoted by ρ
(k)
AB = Tr
( 6k)
AB(ρAB), with Tr
( 6k)
AB
indicating the tracing (averaging) procedure over all the
qudit-pairs except the k-th one. It should be stressed
that Eq. (14) does not at all imply that the overall re-
duced density operator ρAB of the 2N pairs itself, is a
product state of all the reduced pair states ρ
(k)
AB. On the
contrary, ρAB is expected to have a complicated struc-
ture as it includes all the effects arising from a general
coherent (joint) attack of a possible eavesdropper.
In view of Eq. (14), the average disturbance defined in
Eqs. (11) is determined by the average error probability
of an arbitrary qudit pair, say the pair j1, i.e.
D =
1
2
∑
b=0,1
Tr
(j1)
A,B
{[(
Hb†A ⊗HbB
)
P
(
HbA ⊗Hb†B
)]
j1
ρ
(j1)
AB
}
, (15)
where Tr
(j1)
A,B denotes the tracing procedure over the j1-th
qudit pair of Alice and Bob. In other words, the reduced
single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB contains all the information about
the noisy quantum channel and a possible general coher-
ent attack by an eavesdropper, which is relevant for the
evaluation of the error rate. In particular, this implies
that an arbitrary joint eavesdropping attack which gives
rise to a particular state ρAB obeying Eq. (14) is in-
distinguishable, from the point of view of the estimated
disturbance, from a corresponding collective attack which
addresses each qudit individually and results in the 2N -
pair state of the form
⊗2N
j=1 ρ
(j)
AB, for example.
According to Eqs. (12) and (15) the average estimated
disturbance is invariant under the transformations
(l, b) → (l +m, b), (16a)
(l, b) → (l, b⊕ 1), (16b)
with m ∈ Fd, while ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. This
invariance implies that there are various reduced density
operators of the j1-th qudit pair, which all give rise to the
same observed value of the average disturbance. This can
be seen from Eq. (9) which implies elementary relations
of the form
5EmnHb |j〉〈j| (Hb)†E†mn = Hb |j + bn+ (1 − b)m〉〈j + bn+ (1 − b)m| Hb†. (17)
Together with the invariance of D under the transfor-
mations (16), these elementary relations imply that the
reduced operators ρ
(j1)
AB and the symmetrized state
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
4d2
∑
g∈G1,h∈G2
U(h)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(h)†(18)
give rise to the same value of D. Thereby, the unitary
operators
U(gmn) = Emn;A ⊗ E∗mn;B, (19)
U(h1) = 1A ⊗ 1B, U(h3) = (HA ⊗H∗B)2,
U(h2) = HA ⊗H∗B, U(h4) = (HA ⊗H∗B)3, (20)
have been introduced, which form unitary representa-
tions of two discrete Abelian groups G1 = {g00, g01, . . .}
and G2 = {h1, h2, h3, h4}. The key point is now that,
invariance of ρ˜
(j1)
AB under both of these groups is induced
by the symmetry transformations (16) which leave D in-
variant.
V. ENTANGLEMENT DISTILLATION AND
SECRET KEY
Having exploited the symmetries underlying the esti-
mated disturbance, in this section we estimate the thresh-
old disturbance that can, in principle, be tolerated by any
2d-state QKD protocol, under the assumption of arbi-
trary coherent (joint) attacks. To this end, we make use
of the necessary precondition for secret key distillation
that is, the correlations established between Alice and
Bob during the state distribution cannot be explained
by a separable state [38].
Throughout this work, we consider that Alice and Bob
focus on the sifted key during the post processing (i.e.,
they discard immediately all the polarization data for
which they have used different bases) and that they treat
each pair independently. Thus, according to the afore-
mentioned precondition, given a particular value of the
estimated disturbance D, the task of Alice and Bob is to
infer whether their correlations may have originated from
a separable state or not. So, our aim is to estimate the
threshold disturbance Dth such that for any D < Dth Al-
ice and Bob share provable entanglement with certainty.
To this end, we proceed as follows : Firstly, we estimate
the regime of disturbances for which Alice and Bob share
distillable entanglement. Secondly, we demonstrate that
for the remaining regime of disturbances the correlations
shared between Alice and Bob can always be described
by a separable state.
A. Threshold disturbance
Adopting the entanglement-based version of the pro-
tocol defined in Sec. III C, let us estimate the regime of
disturbances for which Alice and Bob share free entan-
glement. From the symmetries underlying the observed
average error rate and in particular from Eq. (18) we
have that the density operator ρ
(j1)
AB is freely entangled if
ρ˜
(j1)
AB is freely entangled, as both states are related by lo-
cal unitary operations and convex summation. Hence, to
determine the values of the disturbance for which the real
state ρ
(j1)
AB is distillable, it suffices to determine the distur-
bances for which the most general two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB
(which is invariant under the discrete Abelian groups G1
and G2) is distillable.
We already know that the operators U(g10) ≡ XA⊗X ∗B
and U(g01) ≡ ZA⊗Z∗B of the group G1 constitute a com-
plete set of commuting operators in CdA⊗CdB, while their
simultaneous eigenstates are the d2 maximally entangled
states defined in Eq. (7). Thus, the most general two-
qudit state which is invariant under the Abelian group
G1 is given, by a convex sum of all |Ψmn〉, i.e.
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
∑
m,n∈Fd
λmn |Ψmn〉〈Ψmn| , (21)
where the non-negative parameters λmn have to fulfill
the normalization condition
∑
m,n∈Fd
λmn = 1. (22)
Moreover, the operations HA ⊗ H∗B, (HA ⊗ H∗B)2 and
(HA ⊗H∗B)3 transform Bell states into other Bell states.
Thus, additional invariance of the quantum state (21)
under the discrete group G2 implies that
λm,n = λn,d−m = λd−m,d−n = λd−n,m. (23)
As a consequence of Eq. (23) there are different sets
of identical parameters λmn. Each set j contains four
members ηj unless the chain (23) is truncated. The latter
case occurs for d − m = m and d − n = n, i.e. for
m,n ∈ {0, d/2}. More precisely, the sets j with m = n ∈
{0, d/2} contain one eigenvalue ξj each, whereas the set
with m 6= n ∈ {0, d/2} has two equal eigenvalues denoted
by ζ. From now on we distinguish between even and odd
dimensions d. All the sets for both cases as well as their
notation are summarized in Table I.
Given the various sets of eigenvalues, the normalization
6TABLE I: The notation of the sets and the number of eigen-
values per set for even and odd dimensions.
members per set number of sets notation
Even d Odd d
1 2 1 ξj
2 1 0 ζ
4 (d2 − 4)/4 (d2 − 1)/4 ηj
condition (22) now reads
Odd d : ξ0 + 4
ηodd∑
j=1
ηj = 1,
Even d : ξ0 + ξ1 + 2ζ + 4
ηeven∑
j=1
ηj = 1,
where in both cases the index j runs over all the possible
4-member groups i.e., ηodd ≡ (d2−1)/4 and ηeven ≡ (d2−
4)/4 (see Table I). Similarly, using Eqs. (13), (15) and
(21), the estimated average disturbance can be expressed
in the form
Odd d : D = 2
⌊d/2⌋∑
j=1
ηj + 4
ηodd∑
j=⌊d/2⌋+1
ηj ,
Even d : D = ξ1 + ζ + 2
d/2−1∑
j=1
ηj + 4
ηeven∑
j=d/2
ηj ,
with ⌊x⌋ denoting the largest integer not greater than x,
while all the parameters (disturbance and eigenvalues)
are real-valued and non-negative, i.e.
0 ≤ D, ξj , ζ, ηj ≤ 1.
Let us evaluate now the disturbances for which the
state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is distillable. According to the reduction cri-
terion [32], if ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable, then
ρ˜
(j1)
A ⊗ 1B − ρ˜(j1)AB ≥ 0 (26)
(and also 1A ⊗ ρ˜(j1)B − ρ˜(j1)AB ≥ 0), with ρ˜(j1)A ≡ TrB[ρ˜(j1)AB ].
Using the explicit form of ρ˜
(j1)
AB given by Eq. (21) we have
ρ˜
(j1)
A = ρ˜
(j1)
B = 1 d/d, where 1 d denotes the unit operator
in CdA(B). Thus inequality (26) reads
∑
m,n∈Fd
(
1
d
− λmn
)
|Ψmn〉〈Ψmn| ≥ 0. (27)
Violation of the above inequality (27) for any of the eigen-
values λmn, i.e.
λmn >
1
d
, (28)
is sufficient for distillability of the entanglement of ρ˜
(j1)
AB
and implies violation of the Peres criterion (i.e., a non-
positive partial transpose) for this state [32, 33]. In par-
ticular, as long as the fidelity f of ρ˜
(j1)
AB with respect to
|Ψ00〉 satisfies
f ≡ 〈Ψ00| ρ˜(j1)AB |Ψ00〉 >
1
d
, (29)
the state can be distilled with the help of unitary twirling
operations UA ⊗ U∗B which leave f invariant [32]. In our
case, using Eqs. (21) and (23) the distillability condition
(29) reads ξ0 > 1/d or equivalently
Odd d : D < D0 + 2
ηodd∑
j=⌊d/2⌋+1
ηj ,
Even d : D < D0 +
1
2
ξ1 + 2
ηeven∑
j=d/2
ηj ,
where
D0 ≡ d− 1
2d
. (31)
According to these last inequalities, and given the fact
that ξj , ζ, ηj ≥ 0, the threshold disturbance Dth for en-
tanglement distillation at any dimension satisfies the in-
equality
Dth ≥ D0, (32)
with D0 given by (31). For any D < Dth, the sym-
metrized state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is always distillable (i.e., freely en-
tangled). Given that ρ
(j1)
AB and ρ˜
(j1)
AB are related via local
operarations and convex summation, the original state
ρ
(j1)
AB must also be distillable in the same regime of dis-
turbances.
Nevertheless, the fact that inequality (29) is not sat-
isfied for D ≥ Dth, does not necessarily imply that the
state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is not at all distillable for D ≥ Dth. For in-
stance, there might exist another eigenvalue λmn (and
not ξ0) which satisfies inequality (28) [i.e., it violates in-
equality (26)] and this fact, according to the the reduc-
tion criterion, is also sufficient for distillability of ρ˜
(j1)
AB
[32]. Hence, we must now evaluate the precise value of
the threshold disturbance Dth.
One way to prove that strict equality holds in Eq. (32)
for any 2d-state QKD protocol is to demonstrate that for
D ≥ D0, there always exist separable states which can
describe Alice’s and Bob’s correlations and simultane-
ously are indistinguishable from the real bipartite state
ρ
(j1)
AB . To this end, let us focus on bipartite Bell-diagonal
states i.e., states which can be written in the form (21)
and consider the following particularly simple family of
such separable states
7σAB(D) = y1 d2 + d|x− y|
∑
k∈Fd
( |kA〉〈kA| )⊗ ( |kB〉〈kB | )
d
+ d|x− y|
∑
i∈Fd
(
σ˜
(i)
A ⊗ σ˜(i)B
)
. (33)
Thereby
x =
1 + d(d− 2)(1−D)
d2(d− 1) ,
y =
1 + d(−1 + 2D)
d2(d− 1) ,
and
σ˜
(i)
C =
1
d
∑
k∈Fd
|kC〉〈(k + i)C | ,
while 1 d2 denotes the unit operator in C
d
A ⊗ CdB.
This family is parametrized by the estimated average
disturbance D detected by Alice and Bob and is valid for
d− 1
2d
= D0 ≤ D ≤ 2d− 1
2d
. (34)
Moreover, any separable state which belongs to this fam-
ily is indistinguishable, from the point of view of the es-
timated error rate, from the real state shared between
Alice and Bob. In other words, whenever the detected
disturbance D is within the interval (34), the correlations
shared between Alice and Bob can be very well described
in the framework of the family of seprable states σAB(D).
In such a case, the necessary precondition for secret key
distillation is not met for disturbances within this regime,
so that the protocol must be aborted.
So, we have proved that strict equality holds in (32)
and thus, from Alice’s and Bob’s point of view, the
threshold disturbance for entanglement distillation in the
context of entanglement-based 2d-state QKD protocols is
Dth =
d− 1
2d
. (35)
In particular, if the detected average disturbance is be-
low this threshold, the two legitimate users can be as-
sured that they share freely entangled qudit-pairs with
high probability. In other words, under the assumption
of general coherent attacks, for D < Dth Alice and Bob
are always able to extract a secret key by application of a
two-way EPP which purifies towards the maximally en-
tangled state |Ψ00〉. On the other hand, an estimated
disturbance above Dth = (d − 1)/2d, does not allow Al-
ice and Bob to infer whether the state they share is en-
tangled or not. In particular, we have seen that there
is at least one simple family of separable states which
can describe Alice’s and Bob’s correlations up to high
error rates of magnitude (2d − 1)/2d. Finally, note that
for d = 2 we reveal the threshold disturbance for the
standard BB84 QKD protocol, that is Dth = 1/4 [45].
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FIG. 1: (Color online) 2d-state QKD protocols : The thresh-
old disturbance for entanglement distillation as a function of
dimension. The triangles refer to Eq. (35) and arbitrary co-
herent attacks whereas the circles correspond to Eq. (36) and
optimal cloning machines.
Moreover, Dth → 1/2 for d → ∞ reflecting the possible
advantage of using higher-dimensional quantum systems
as information carriers in quantum cryptography.
In view of the necessary precondition for secret key
distillation [38], our results imply that Dth is also the
ultimate upper security bound of any 2d-state prepare-
and-measure QKD protocol. Nevertheless, the details
of a particular prepare-and-measure scheme (that is the
error correction and privacy amplification protocols re-
quired) which will be capable of meeting this upper secu-
rity bound remain an open question. In fact one has to
specify a classical distillation (post-processing) protocol
which has the same bounds of tolerable noise as quantum
distillation protocols. It is worth mentioning, however,
that the security bound (35) relies on certain conditions.
In particular, it relies on the complete omission of any
polarization data from the raw key that involve differ-
ent bases for Alice and Bob, as well as on the individual
manipulation of each pair during the post-processing. If
some of these conditions are changed, also the threshold
disturbance may change.
Recently, under the same conditions, Acin et al. [25]
derived another bound for entanglement distillation,
namely
D
(CM)
th = 1−
1√
d
. (36)
As depicted in Fig. 1, D
(CM)
th is well above the thresh-
old we have derived in this work for any dimension of
8the information carriers. The reason is basically that
D
(CM)
th has been obtained under the additional assump-
tion that Eve is restricted to so-called “optimal incoher-
ent attacks”. These attacks rely on cloning machines and
maximize Eve’s information gain. One can easily ver-
ify, for example, that the class of separable states (33)
is not optimal (in the sense of [25]). In our work we
allow for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks and thus we
have demonstrated that the distillation of a secret key
for disturbances above Dth is impossible. So, although
the incoherent attacks considered in [25] are optimal with
respect to the information gain of an eavesdropper, they
are not able to disentangle Alice and Bob at the lowest
possible disturbance. The cost of information loss that
Eve has to accept by employing an attack that disentan-
gles Alice and Bob at each particular disturbance above
Dth remains an open question. Clearly, to this end one
has to consider in detail the eavesdropping attack and
this is beyond the purpose of this work.
A further issue ought to be brought up here in con-
nection with the existence of bound entanglement. For
2 ⊗ 2 systems (i.e., for the BB84 QKD protocol) non-
distillability is equivalent to separability [34] and this
fact seems to lead to a complete equivalence between en-
tanglement distillation and secrecy [35]. However, for
higher dimensions the situation is more involved due to
the existence of bound entangled states with positive or
non-positive partial transpose [33, 37]. Moreover, in a re-
cent work [36] Horedecki et al. showed that a secret key
can be distilled even from bound entangled states. As a
consequence, a qudit-based (with d > 2) QKD scheme
could, in principle, go beyond entanglement distillation.
However, this does not seem to be the case for the post
processing and the protocols we consider throughout this
work.
Indeed, forD < Dth we have seen that the state shared
between Alice and Bob is always distillable, i.e. it is
freely entangled. Bound entangled states are expected
to exist for D ≥ Dth and this is precisely the regime
of parameters where the ideas presented in [36] can be
used for the extraction of a secret key beyond entangle-
ment distillation. We have demonstrated, however, that
an eavesdropper is always able to break any entangle-
ment between Alice and Bob for D ≥ Dth without being
detected, by preparing, for example, a separable state
from the family σAB(D). As a consequence, according
to [38], the protocol must be aborted at D = Dth. Un-
der these circumstances, the extraction of a secret key
beyond entanglement distillation seems to be practically
impossible. The reason is basically that, based on the
estimated error rate, Alice and Bob are incapable of ver-
ifying whether they share a separable state or not for dis-
turbances above D ≥ Dth. Alice and Bob can improve
their situation only if they do not restrict themselves to
the sifted data only. In particular, constructing appro-
priate entanglement witnesses from their raw data [38],
Alice and Bob can verify whether they share a separable
state or not, even for D ≥ Dth.
Closing this section, let us briefly compare the perfor-
mance of two different realizations of a six-state QKD
protocol, namely a 3-bases scheme using qubits and a
qutrit-based scheme using 2 out of 4 mutually unbiased
bases. In principle, both protocols can tolerate precisely
the same error rate, that is 1/3. Nevertheless, the qutrit-
based protocol offers a higher yield since 1/2 of the trans-
missions pass the sifting procedure (compared to 1/3 for
the qubit-based protocol). Thus, although both six-state
protocols appear to be equally secure, the qutrit based
scheme seems to be more efficient.
B. Examples
So far, our discussion involved arbitrary dimensions
and general coherent attacks. For the sake of illustration,
in this subsection we briefly discuss low dimensions (i.e.,
d = 2, 3) as well as symmetric (isotropic) channels [24,
25] and arbitrary dimensions. In particular, we present
evidence of the fact that for d = 3 any eavesdropping
strategy is equivalent to a symmetric one. However, for
d > 3 this equivalence does not seem to exist anymore.
Moreover, we present numerical results for d = 3, 4 and
5, verifying the security bounds derived in the previous
subsection.
1. Qubits
As a consequence of Eq. (23), for d = 2 there are three
different eigenvalues entering Eq. (21). So, in a matrix
form we may write
λmn =
(
u x
x y
)
, (37)
with the eigenvalues u, x and y satisfying the normal-
ization condition u + 2x + y = 1. In this notation,
the estimated disturbance can be expressed in the form
D = x + y. One can easily verify that the state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is
entangled for 1/4 < D and D > 3/4 [45]. Moreover, for
1/4 ≤ D ≤ 3/4 the state ρ˜(j1)AB is always separable and
indistinguishable (as far as the estimated disturbance is
concerned) from the real state ρ
(j1)
AB shared between Alice
and Bob.
2. Qutrits
In analogy to qubits, applying Eq. (23) for d = 3
and without any additional assumptions one finds that
there are three different eigenvalues entering Eq. (21).
In particular, the matrix of eigenvalues reads
λmn =

 u x xx y y
x y y

 , (38)
9while the average estimated disturbance is of the form
D = 2x+ 4y. Hence, taking into account the normaliza-
tion condition u+ 4(x+ y) = 1, we have two real-valued
and non-negative independent parameters in the prob-
lem. Moreover, the partial transpose of ρ˜
(j1)
AB is block-
diagonal with all three blocks being identical and equal
to
M3 =
1
3

 u+ 2x x− y x− yx− y x+ 2y u− x
x− y u− x x+ 2y

 .
Hence, the following two eigenvalues
ν1 =
1
3
(−u+ 2x+ 2y) ,
ν2 =
1
3
(
u+ x+ y −
√
3(x− y)
)
,
determine the sign of the partial transpose of ρ˜
(j1)
AB . Re-
lated numerical results will be presented below.
3. Isotropic quantum channels
For d > 3 the number of independent parameters in
the problem increases enormously with d, e.g. for d = 4
we have
λmn =


ξ0 η1 ζ η1
η1 η2 η3 η2
ζ η3 ξ1 η3
η1 η2 η3 η2

 . (40)
However, the situation becomes tractable in the case of
isotropic channels (e.g., open-space QKD) where distur-
bances involving different errors [46] are equal, thus lead-
ing to an eigenvalue matrix of the form [22, 24, 25]
λmn =


u x . . . x
x y . . . y
...
...
. . .
...
x y . . . y

 , (41)
for any dimension d.
In the case of qubits, such an isotropy argument does
not seem to be a restriction. Thus, any eavesdropping
strategy is equivalent to a symmetric (i.e., isotropic) one
[47]. This might be due to the fact that such a symmetry
arises automatically as an inherent property of the qubit-
based QKD protocols [the matrix (37) is of the form (41)].
As a consequence, one is always able to substitute any
eavesdropping attack with a symmetric one which yields
the same results for all the properties which are defined
as averages over all the possible messages sent by Alice
to Bob (e.g., estimated disturbance) [47]. Besides, here
we see that the symmetry (isotropy) arises automatically
for qutrits [the matrix (38) is for the form (41)] and thus
similar arguments must hold for d = 3 as well. Nev-
ertheless, we have found that for d > 3 this symmetry
does not exist [see for instance Eq. (40) for d = 4] and
one has to apply it explicitly. Hence, unless the quan-
tum channel itself is isotropic, a restriction to symmetric
eavesdropping strategies for d > 3 seems unreasonable
and might, in general, underestimate Eve’s power. How-
ever, in our case such a restriction does not seem to affect
the threshold disturbance, while simultaneously enabling
us to present numerical results regarding 2d-state QKD
protocols with d > 3.
So, using the matrix (41), the normalization condition
(22) reads
u+ 2(d− 1)x+ (d− 1)2y = 1,
and only two of the three parameters (u, x, y) are inde-
pendent. Moreover, combining Eqs. (13), (15) and (21)
we have that the average estimated disturbance is given
by
D = (d− 1)x+ (d− 1)2y.
Finally, in analogy to the case of qutrits, the partial
transpose of ρ˜
(j1)
AB is block-diagonal with each block be-
ing a d × d matrix. For odd dimensions all the blocks
are identical whereas for even dimensions two different
blocks appear.
4. Numerical results and discussion
We have been able to test the results of Sec.VA nu-
merically for qutrits, while for higher dimensions we had
to resort to the assumption of isotropic quantum chan-
nels, to reduce the number of independent parameters
in our simulations. More precisely, fixing two indepen-
dent parameters, say D and x − y, we evaluated all the
remaining parameters u, x, y which are consistent with
all the constraints. Subsequently, for the parameters at
hand we checked whether the distillability condition (28)
is fulfilled and whether the two-qudit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB has a
non-positive partial transpose (NPPT). The correspond-
ing “distillability maps” for d = 3, 4, 5 are presented in
Figs. 2.
Our simulations confirm the validity of
Dth =
d− 1
2d
as the ultimate robustness bound for 2d-state QKD pro-
tocols. More precisely, for D < Dth Alice and Bob share
always freely entangled qudit pairs [regime (a) in Figs. 2].
On the contrary, for D ≥ Dth we can identify two differ-
ent regimes of parameters. The dominant regime (b) in-
volves parameters which yield a ρ˜
(j1)
AB with positive partial
transpose (PPT). These states can not be distilled and
are either separable or bound entangled [33, 37]. Besides,
we have the regime of parameters (c), for which ρ˜
(j1)
AB has a
NPPT but the reduction criterion is not violated. These
states probably belong to the hypothetical set of bound
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FIG. 2: (Color online) 2d-state QKD protocols: The regions
of the independent parameters D and x − y for which the
qudit-pair state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is (a) NPPT and distillable ; (b) PPT;
(c) NPPT but the reduction criterion is satisfied. From the
top to the bottom, the “distillability maps” correspond to
d = 5, 4 and 3, respectively. The non-negativity of x, y andu
(straight lines) defines the region of parameters where the pro-
tocols operate while the distillability condition (29) separates
distillable from non-distillable states. The threshold distur-
bances for entanglement distillation are indicated by black
dots. The triangles correspond to the separable state (33).
Note the different scales of the horizontal axis.
entangled states with NPPT [32, 33]. At this point, it
could be argued that D ≥ Dth is the regime of parame-
ters where the ideas of Horodecki et al. might be appli-
cable for the distillation of a secret key from bound en-
tangled states [36]. To this end, however, Alice and Bob
have to confirm whether the state they share is indeed
bound entangled. Such an identification is only possi-
ble with the help of appropriate additional entanglement
witnesses constructed from the polarization data of the
raw key [38].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the robustness of qudit-based QKD
protocols that use two mutually unbiased bases, under
the assumption of general coherent (joint) attacks. For
d = 3 (i.e., for qutrits), we have presented evidence of
the fact that any eavesdropping strategy is equivalent to
a symmetric one, while for higher dimensions this equiv-
alence is no longer valid.
The lowest possible disentanglement bound that an
eavesdropper can saturate in the context of these cryp-
tographic protocols scales with dimension as (d− 1)/2d.
Whenever Alice and Bob detect disturbances above (d−
1)/2d, they are not able to infer whether their correla-
tions originate from an entangled state or not, and the
protocol must be aborted. On the contrary, if the de-
tected disturbance is below (d − 1)/2d, the two honest
parties can be confident that they share free entangle-
ment with high probability and the extraction of a secret
key is, in principle, possible.
In particular, for the entanglement-based version of
the protocols such a secure key can be obtained af-
ter applying an appropriate EPP which purifies the qu-
dit pairs shared between Alice and Bob towards |Ψ00〉
[29, 30, 31, 32]. Moreover, in view of the fundamental role
of entanglement in secret key distribution [38], the de-
velopment of qudit-based prepare-and-measure schemes
that can tolerate bit error rates up to (d − 1)/2d is also
possible. For this purpose, however, the construction
of new appropriate two-way EPPs, which are consistent
with the associated prepare-and-measure schemes seems
to be of vital importance. Our results generalize the re-
sults of [25] to arbitrary coherent attacks and simultane-
ously answer (to some extent) many of the open issues
raised in the concluding remarks of that paper.
Finally, it should be stressed that the disturbance
thresholds we have obtained depend on the post-
processing of the QKD protocol. In particular, they rely
on the complete omission of those qudits of the raw key
for which Alice and Bob measured in different bases. Fur-
thermore, they also rely on the fact that Alice and Bob
manipulate each qudit pair separately. Under these con-
ditions, we have demonstrated that the extraction of a
secret-key from bound entangled states is impossible in
the framework of qudit-based QKD protocols that use
two mutually unbiased bases.
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